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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 980030-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Oral Argument Priority 2

v.
ERNEST SINJU,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE HAS MISINTERPRETED BRECKENRIDGE AND
WILLETT AND HENCE FAILED TO PROPERLY ANALYZE THE
ADEQUACY OF FACTS ADDUCED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA.
The lesson of State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), is simple: In order
to assure that a guilty plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily in compliance with Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 such that due process is satisfied, "a trial court must
develop a factual basis upon which to base a conviction of the charged crime." Id. at 443
(emphasis added). Accord Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2D 860, 861 (Utah 1992). That
requirement was not satisfied in this case because the facts adduced are not sufficient to
support a conviction of the charged crime - "arranging to distribute marijuana, a
controlled substance, in a drug free zone, a second degree felony" (R. 1; R. 71 at 16).

The State skirts this issue by suggesting defendant has conceded he was "at risk of
conviction" because defendant acknowledges his conduct might have supported a charge
of attempted possession. (Br. of Appellee at 9) The State's analysis misses the mark.
A trial court's factual inquiry is adequate to support acceptance of guilty plea only
if the facts adduced put the defendant at risk of being convicted of the charged offense.
To suggest otherwise, as the State implies by ignoring the "charged crime" language of
Breckenridge and Willett is to suggest that a trial court could accept a defendant's guilty
plea to a charge of aggravated assault where the facts adduced only demonstrated the
defendant was "at risk" of being convicted of assault. Similarly in this case, even
assuming the facts adduced showed defendant was "at risk" of being convicted of
attempted possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor), that is not a valid basis for accepting
his guilty plea to the more serious charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance
in a drug free zone.
This Court should reject the State's novel interpretation of Breckenridge and
Willett and reaffirm the guiding principle of those important cases: In order to comport
with due process, compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires
that a trial court adduce sufficient facts to support a conviction for the charged crime
before accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Because the State misinterprets Breckenridge
and Willett, it fails to recognize that the requirements of those cases were not satisfied in
this case.
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A.

If Anybody in This Case "Arranged to Distribute A Controlled
Substance," It Was the Undercover Officer Who Agreed to Sell
Marijuana to Defendant; Defendant Was Merely A Potential Buyer.

The State cites several cases for the proposition that it is the "agreement" which
constitutes the actus reas of "arranging" and that "any witting or intentional lending of aid
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the [arranging
statute]" (Br. of Appellee at 10 to 11). While the cases cited by the State do indeed
support those propositions, the State misapplies them by wholly ignoring the term
"distribute" in its analysis and focusing exclusively on the term "arranging." As
demonstrated below, it was the government who arranged to distribute a controlled
substance in this case; defendant was merely a potential buyer.
The State can point to no evidence indicating that defendant facilitated the sale or
distribution of marijuana. At worst, defendant's conduct might constitute an attempt to
purchase marijuana from the undercover officer. Because it was the undercover agent
who arranged to sell the marijuana to defendant, it logically follows that it was the
government who arranged to distribute the marijuana. Cf State v. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d
1370 (Utah 1977) (Where undercover officer provided marijuana to the defendant,
defendant could not be convicted of distribution: "What is wrong here is that the appellant
did not distribute the substance at all. [The drugs] belonged to the officer and it was the
officer who gave appellant a couple of joints and thereby made the distribution."). Just as
the defendant in Soroushirn was not properly charged with distribution because he merely
received marijuana, so too was it improper to accept defendant's guilty plea to the offense
3

of arranging to distribute when the facts showed only that defendant agreed to receive,
not to distribute, marijuana.
In contrast to Soroushirn and this case, in every case cited by the State the
defendants either personally sold or distributed a controlled substance, or facilitated or
aided in selling or distributing a controlled substance, to a consumer other than
themselves. See State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1977) (defendant escorted
undercover informant from defendant's home to nearby restaurant where drug dealers
were located, introduced informant to drug dealers and explained to dealers that
informant wanted to buy drugs, remained present while dealers sold drugs to informant,
and informant — at defendant's request — gave a small quantity of marijuana to defendant
in exchange "for setting up the buy"); State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)
(defendant arrived at drug dealer's home and was introduced to undercover agent acting
as a buyer, defendant vouched for quality of the drugs to be sold, was present when agent
gave buy money to dealer, defendant used her own car to drive the dealer to another
location to pickup the drugs while the agent remained at dealer's house, defendant
announced "we got it" upon returning to dealer's house, defendant poured cocaine onto a
mirror and divided it for distribution to agent, placed portion of the cocaine in a bindle
and handed it to the agent; defendant engaged in very similar conduct during second drug
sale); State v. Renfro. 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987) (defendant discussed sales price of
marijuana with undercover officers, went into another room and retrieved marijuana,
agreed on a price for the marijuana, and then sold the marijuana to the officers); State v.
4

Clark, 783 P.2d 68 (Utah App. 1989) (defendant told undercover agent that he was
partners with another drug dealer, vouched for quality of the cocaine that the other dealer
was going to sell to the agent, defendant attempted to contact the dealer, was present
during the sales negotiations, and warned the undercover agent that he may have been
being tailed by another car); State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990) (defendant
directed agent to drive to a store where defendant and another cohort called a drug dealer
from a pay phone and dealer later arrived and sold cocaine to the agent). See also State v.
Scott. 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987) (defendant should have been charged with arranging to
distribute instead of aiding and abetting another in distribution where defendant, in his
own home, apparently handled negotiations regarding price of marijuana and someone
else handed the marijuana to an informant); State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983)
(reversing defendant's conviction of distribution for value on grounds that there was no
evidence defendant received any portion of the buy money but noting defendant's
conduct was a "classic case" of arranging to distribute where defendant directed
undercover officer to the drug buy location, procured buy money from the officer,
purchased the drugs, and delivered the drugs to the officer).
In sum, a mere buyer or user of a controlled substance cannot be charged with
"distributing" or "arranging to distribute" a controlled substance. Even the cases relied
upon by the State at least implicitly support that proposition.

5

B. The State Has Failed to Address the Statutory Definition of "Distribute."
While the State focuses exclusively on cases interpreting the term "arranging,"
defendant relied on the statutory definition of "distribute" to demonstrate that his actions
did not fall within the ambit of aiding or facilitating the "distribution" of marijuana. (Br.
of Appellant at 13) The State's failure to respond to defendant's statutory language
argument, as does its misplaced reliance on Harrison and its progeny, stems from the
State's failure to examine to the nature of the charge filed against defendant in light of
title 58 as a whole instead of the narrow definition of "arranging" considered in isolation.
Under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2(n), "distribute" "means to deliver other than by
administering or dispensing a controlled substance or listed chemical." In contrast,
"possession" requires only that a person "joint[ly] or individual[ly] own[], control,. . .
hold[,] retain[ or] . . . maintain[] [a controlled substance] as distinguished from
distribution^

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2(dd) (1998) (emphasis added). Logically

construed in light of the statutory definitions of distribute and possess in the context of
title 58 as a whole, the offense of "arranging to distribute a controlled substance" must
require more than merely agreeing to purchase or possess a controlled substance for
personal use. As explained in defendant's main brief, the latter type of conduct is
covered under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) and is punished less severely than violations
of subsection 8(1). The facts in this case make clear that defendant, at worst, agreed to
buy (attempted to possess) a quantity of marijuana consistent with personal use. He
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should have been charged, if at all, under subsection 8(2). His plea to a second degree
felony should never have been accepted.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE STATE'S WAIVER
ARGUMENTS AS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND
INCONSISTENT WITH PREVAILING CASE LAW.
All of the procedural bar arguments advanced by the State are both factually and
legally without merit. For clarity, each is addressed below.
A.

Defendant Preserved His Claim That the Facts Did Not Support His
Plea of Guilty to the Charged Offense.

The question of whether the facts supported defendant's guilty plea to the second
degree felony offense of arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone
was raised by defendant below, and the trial court expressly ruled on the issue:
Defendant: They ask me to give them some money. I tell them no. I want to
buy marijuana. They say forget about marijuana, this is important. I say
forget it. They say I can get it for you. They went and bought it, and I say,
"oh, you guys take forever." I hide my 100 dollar. Just because they say
we get it, I say, "no, I can't afford it. I got it from somebody else." They
look at me like that —
The Court: But at any rate, you did indicate to them, when they said they could
get you some, you said go ahead and get it.
Defendant: Yeah, I said that.
7

The Court: That's arranging to distribute; okay?
Defendant: Yes.
(R. 71 at 13-15).
The State effectively concedes that defendant argued his conduct did not support
his guilty plea and that the trial court ruled on the issue when it determined defendant's
conduct constituted "arranging to distribute" (R. 71 at 15). (Br. of Appellee at 6)
Consistent with its duty to "promote justice," one would expect the State to concede
defendant properly preserved his claim for appeal. See, e.g., State v. One 1979 Pontiac
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah App. 1989) ("A matter is sufficiently raised if it is
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue.").
The State instead contends defendant "agreed" with the trial court's determination that his
conduct constituted "arranging to distribute" and therefore expressly waived his claim on
appeal. (Br. of Appellee at 6.) The State reads too much into defendant's acquiescence
to the trial court's ruling. The more logical interpretation of defendant's comment is that
he was indicating to the trial court that he understood the court's ruling, not that he
waived his right to contest the trial court's decision.
In any event, the State's position is at odds with Utah law because defendant was
not required to argue with the trial court even after the trial court held that defendant's
conduct constituted "arranging to distribute" (R. 71 at 15). Utah law makes clear that a
party need not take exception with a court's adverse ruling in order to preserve an issue
for appellate review. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1992) ("We have
8

never required criminal defendants who have properly presented a claim to take exception
to a trial court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve the issue on appeal."); State v.
Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1992) ("While the words 'due process,' or the
language of [the applicable statute] were never expressly referred to by Starnes's counsel,
an objection . . . was made, considered by the trial court, and rejected. The issue was
therefore preserved for appeal[, and] Starnes had no duty to take exception to the trial
court's erroneous ruling."). This Court should reject the State's waiver argument because
it is predicated on the mistaken notion that defendant was required to take exception with
the trial court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve that issue for appeal.
Morever, in his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant argued that he
was not guilty of the charged offense (R. 27), and the trial court summarily denied
defendant's motion (R. 31). The trial court therefore considered and rejected defendant
claim that he was not guilty of arranging to distribute not just once, but twice. The fact
that the State acknowledges all of these facts in its brief (Br. of Appellee at 3-4, 7),
demonstrates that its waiver argument is untenable.1

1

The State mistates the record when it claims the basis of defendant's pro se
motion to withdraw his plea was merely predicated on a claim that "he had not actually
purchased the marijuana" (Br. of Appellee at 7 citing R. 25, 29). A review of defendant's
pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as well as the motion filed by his appointed
counsel, reveals that defendant did not proclaim his innocence on the ground attributed to
him by the State. Rather, defendant reiterated that he did not believe he was "guilty [of]
the charges th[at were] brought against [him] by the State of Utah" (i.e., the facts adduced
did not support defendant's guilty plea to the charged offense) (R. 27). Finally, the
State's claim that defendant was motivated to withdraw his guilty plea because he was
(continued...)
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B.

The State's Claim that Defendant Waived his Right to Challenge the
Adequacy of the Facts Supporting His Guilty Plea Merely by Pleading
Guilty Is Contrary to Both Utah and Federal Law,

The State next contends that defendant waived his challenge to the facts
underlying his conviction by pleading guilty. (Br. of Appellee at 7-8) That position is
predicated on a misinterpretation of case law. Specifically, the State emphasizes that
"[t]he general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that by pleading guilty, the
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged
and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1277
(Utah 1989).

The State similarly cites State v. Yeck. 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977), State

v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991), to support its claim that, because a knowing
and voluntary guilty plea requires the waiver of the right to go to trial, it follows that a
trial court's duty to inquire into the facts of the case is limited and that a defendant
normally cannot contest those facts. In other words, Parsons, Yeck and Smith
collectively stand for the proposition that, as a general rule, where a defendant enters a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea he cannot later challenge the validity of that plea or the
facts supporting it.

^...continued)
concerned what impact a conviction might have on his immigrant status (Br. of Appellee
at 7) is legally irrelevant to question of whether the facts adduced supported defendant's
plea to the charged offense. If anything, one would hope that defendant's appointed
counsel and the court would have more carefully scrutinized the validity of defendant's
plea in light of that additional concern.
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But defendant does not challenge the facts adduced. Rather, as in Breckenridge
and Willett defifc»- 1 m*

-

.%.p,.

: :il

, ^vrAiction as a

matter of law and that his plea therefore should not have been accepted as knowing :i:\i
voluntary. Accordingly, the "general rule" pressed by the State is inapplicable in this
case

*;

Breckenrid^i ami w n -.-u = : v

.m^e cases, a

defendant may properly challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the grounds that there
was no connection between the facts of the case and the elements of the charged offense.
In M; K Breckenridge and Wihus ..

:

i

\v v ' = ..«.•

)f Parsons,

Yeck and Smith. That exception is necessary to ensure the integrity of the plea process:
"Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it
cannot hv tniU \ Lint m miiLss (lin defendant possesses ..

wciM^rhhik/ ,M -h: ij-\ n

relation to the facts." Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 444, quoting McCarthy v. United
States, JV4 i...^. 4y*. 4oo (1969) (footnote omitted). Defendant's challenge to his guilty
plea falls son.-pv!
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.. •,

?

, Breckenridge •*• d WiiL-u • ^..: M, ..yicnaa:K ^

sole claim is and always has been that his conduct did not support a guilty plea to the
charged offense.
v..

Defendant Correctly Briefed His Claim Under the Authority of
Breckenridge and Willett Instead of Current Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Because the Latter Was Not In Effect At the Time
Defendant's Plea Was Accepted.
1 if

istan iing the State''s assertion to the conti ai ) , defendant has appropriately

briefed his claim on appeal based on the version of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedmv I I I

was in effect at the time defendant's plea was taken as it had been interpreted in State v.
Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), and Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992).
The State's criticism of defendant for not briefing his claim under current rule 11 is
misplaced because — as the State itself acknowledges — the current version of rule 11 was
not in effect at the time the trial court accepted defendant's plea. (Br. of Appellee at 8 n.5)
Defendant therefore briefed his claim under the auspices of Breckenridge and Willett because
those cases provided the authoritative interpretation of rule 11 as it existed at the time the
trial court accepted defendant's plea.
D*

Defendant's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Argument Encompasses the
Applicability of the Drug Free Zone Enhancement.

Finally, the State's claim that defendant has failed to allege his trial counsel was
ineffective for not challenging application of the "drug free zone" enhancement to increase
the degree of conviction entered against defendant is spurious. Defendant alleged in his
opening brief that trial counsel was ineffective for advising defendant to enter a guilty plea
to the offense as charged and enhanced to a second degree felony. (Appellant's brief at 1819, n.l) The State's attempt to parse out the issue of enhancement from defendant's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his guilty plea is legal hairsplitting
because the validity of defendant's guilty plea and the propriety of the enhancement are
intertwined and equally dependent upon the adequacy of the facts adduced by the trial court.
The State's procedural bar argument rings hollow because the State not only acknowledges
that defendant has raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but it even "agrees"
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with defendant that there are no facts to support the enhancement and urges the enhancement
be vacated. (Br. of Appellee at 13) Instead of straining to find yet another procedural bar
W n r u ; iHMiv* c \ i ^ i

.• M u.

-\> .

: ,

•• . x \ k :

;^

t.

CONCLUSION
None of the State's waiver arguments are meritorious, and they should all be expressly

The facts adduced in support of defendant's guilty plea do not establish a factual
connection between defendant's conduct and the elements of the charged offense as required
under the Breckenridge/Willett constr i iction c i i i il 3 11 I Il: "te tr ial • :: en n t thei efoi e en e cl! i.1 I
accepting defendant's guilty plea, and defendant's appointed counsel was ineffective in
advising defendant to plead guilty. This Court should reverse defendant's conviction and
he Id that ill c r dei fc i a defendant to be

.i:^

• >. .uniu u *s -t*

more than merely agree to purchase a controlled substance.
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